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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
JESSE SMITH and ELLA MAY 
SMITH, his wife, 
P"la.intif! s and A ppella;nts, 
vs. 
ARROWHEAD F;REI~G,HT 
LINES LIMITED, a corpora-
tion, 
Defendant and Respondwnt. 
JOSEPH E. N E L S 0 N and 
MA'RY JANE. NELS·ON, his 
wife, 
Plaintiffs ood Appellants, 
vs. 
ARROWHEAD FREIGHT 
I.1INES LIMITED, a corpora-
tion 
' Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 6213 
Case No. 6212 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
THE F'1AC'TS 
Before .addressing ourselves to the contentions af ap-
pellants upon these appeals we take the liberty of pre-
senting the fruets in some detail. We do thi~s because we 
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most earnestly believe that a ·clear understanding of all 
of the .facts will imp·el t~he ·court to the view that as a 
matter of law plaintiff's are not ·entitled to recover. If 
we should be in error in this contention then a detailed 
revievv- •of the evidence will still make it perfectly clear 
that plaintiffs w·ere .accorded a fair trial and tbe verdict 
of the jury ~should not be dis turhed. 
. These ca~ses ar.i.se from a highway collision between 
a truck of defendant ·company and a F·ord single sea.te<;l 
coupe, which occur~ed between Santaquin ·and Spring 
Lake in Utah County •nn Nove1nber 17, 19·37. The fatal 
trip, insofar as the occupants of the Ford coupe were 
concerned, began at Dell's Inn, a small soft drink estab-
lishment located on Highway 91 just ~south of Santaquin. 
Vaughan ISheffield, P·aul Nelson .and D~on Simmons had 
resorted . to D·ell ',s Inn earlier in the evening and were 
there visiting when ;Ramona Smith and Alta Ewell joined 
them some time after 10 :00 o '·clock in the evening. ( Tr. 
7, 16) 
Sheffield was possessed of the Ford coupe and: a.t 
some-one's suggestion all five of the persons named de-
cided to ride from the inn over to P.ay.son. It is important 
to note how the ~v~ persons were distributed in the small 
car. Vaughan Sheffield placed himself in the driver's 
seat under the .steering wheel. He was a .full groWii and 
n1arried young man s:omewhat shorter and ~stockier than 
D·on ,.Simmons; who testified .that he w.as just under six 
feet in height. (Tr. 26) Next to Sheffield and at his 
right sat Alta Ewell, a grown young woman weighing ap-
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proximately 160. pounds. CTr. 12) · On· Alta Ewell's lap. 
sat Ramona Smith, "rhose weight was estimated by the 
witn€ss Ewell a.t 140 pounds. CTr. 12) On Alta'~s right 
sat Don Simmons and on Simmons' lap was Paul Nelson. 
The little -car was provided with a windshield in front, 
a window in the door on either ~side and a. window in the 
back. A0cording to plaintiffs' version, after the passen-
gers took their places in the coupe all windows were 
tightly closed to keep out the cold and the windshield 
wiper was put in motion to improve the driver's vision 
against the rain. (Tr. 8, 17) Thu.s loaded and thus 
equipped the party left the inn in the direeti,on of Spring 
Lake and Payson. The highway led them .out of Santa-
quin in an easterly direction toward the foothills. Ac-
c-ording to the testimony of Simmons as they proceeded 
eastward the wind dire·ction was .sueh that the rain was 
much heavier against the left window and upon the left 
side of the winds'hield than .against or upon other· parts 
of the coupe. ( Tr. 2'5) 
After the highway reached the foothills it turned to 
the left and took a direction ·only slightly east of north. 
In making the turn to the left the coupe ran so far onto 
the outside of the ·curve that it went off the tc:ement onto 
the .outside .shoulder .and almost failed to make the curve. 
('Tr. 66) It righted itself and came hack onto the cement 
portion of the highway and at a point four ·hundred feet 
north of the curve it ran into defendant's southbound 
truck. The colli.sion resulted fatally to Sheffield, Nelson 
and Ramona Smith. 
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An examination of the facts immediately surround-
ing the ·collision requires the .conclusion, we submit, that 
the driver of the truck was, a~s a matter of law, free from 
any negligence. At the time of the collisi·on the truck 
was .on the right-hand or west side of the highway, where 
it belonged, and the driver did or omitted nothing which 
contributed to the ac;cident. The ·case was tried by both 
sides .and submitted to the jury up'On the theory that if 
the truck was on the west or the driver's righthand side 
of the highway at the time of the collision there could be 
no recovery by any plaintiff. How sta.nds the record 
upon that p'oint~ 
Three persons who were in the ·Collision survived to 
give their testim·ony. Alta Ewell and D'on Simmons, who 
were passenger's in the coupe, and Alvin Samuelson, the 
driver of the truck. But more important than the testi-
mony of .any survivor was the evidence left upon and 
near the highway by the vehicles involved. 
A.s heretofore stated, Alta Ewell sat in the middle 
of the single seat in the -coupe. To her left was the 
driver and on her lap was Ram.ona ~Smith and to. her right 
Don Simmons and Paul Nelson. Alta testified that she 
''couldn't very well see out''. ( Tr. 12) She saw the 
body of the truck just the instant before the collision 
but s·he did not pretend t·oi sa.y where either of the ve-
hicles wa.s upon the highway at the time of impact. The 
coupe was so :crowded that she could not ·See out and her, 
testimony shed no light whatsoever upon the cause of 
the accident. 
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Don Simmons made more of an effort to be helpful 
to plaintiffs, but an examination of his testimony will 
disclose that he created no suhstantial~conflict with the 
evidence of the defendant. Seated hack in the corner a.s 
he was with a six foot young man on his lap and two 
women, one sitting upon the other, ·crowded against him 
upon the left, it is extremely doubtful that he could see 
through the windshield at all. He stated that he looked 
over Paul Nelson's shoulder, but we contend that the law 
will not permit any weight to be given to .such elaim, but 
even if we assume that he could squirm .and stretch in 
such manner as to permit a fleeting glimpse .of the truck 
before the accident, still he tells nothing which could 
fasten liability upon the defendant. 
Upon dire-ct examination Simmons asserted that he 
got a glimpse over Paul Nelson's .shoulder when the truck 
was ten yards .away, and that the truck was then ''three 
feet ·over the yellow line". ('Tr. 20) But he did not say 
the truck was .over the yellow line to the ~ast. Undoubted-
ly the truck was over the yellow line to the west of the cen-
ter of the highway ·and Simmons' statement cannot sup-
p~ort an inference to the contrary. But more important, 
Simmons testified that he did not know whether either 
the Ford or the truck changed its course after he saw 
the truck. ('Tr. 34) In view of the positive evidence of 
the truck driver that the F.ord ·coupe suddenly changed 
its course immediately before the collision and that the 
point of impact occurred west of the center of the high-
way, leaves Simmons' testimony insufficient to raise a 
question .of fact as t.o where the collision occurred. 
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Samuelson sat alone in the driver's seat of the truck. 
For some distance irrnnedia tely before the collision he 
was driving almost directly south. About four hundred 
feet south of the colli,sion the highway turns to the west. 
As he moved .southward .along the high\vay Samuelson 
c.ould see the lights .of an au t'o·mo bile approaching the 
curve from the west. As the automobile, which proved 
to be the Ford coupe involved, reached the curve it \vent 
so far out ont'01 the .outer edge of the curve that it left 
the ·cement .and moved onto the shouder. (Tr. 66) It was 
then plain to Samuelson that the driver of the Ford was 
having difficulty in guiding the machine back onto the 
cement pnrtion of the highway and negotiating the curve 
to the north. When the Ford finally made the turn so 
that its lights were facing ,Sa,muelson it suddenly moved 
aeros.s from the ea.st side .o.f the highway to the west 
side. Immediately upon observing that the Ford was 
no~t under full control ·Samuelson pulled his truck to the, 
extreme west side of the highway so that his righthand 
wheels were running on the edge .of the shoulder which 
bordered the eement strip. ('Tr. 67) 
After ,passing suddenly from the east to the west side 
of the highway the F'ord seemed to right itself and moved 
northwards .for a time with its whee~ls straddling the cen-
ter line .of the ·cement but tending to get back onto the 
east side of the highway where it belonged. But this 
tendency o.f the Ford to regain its proper side of the 
highway was only momentary and just before the col-
lision the Ford sharply changed its ·Course to the west 
and '~'lurched'' into the left end of the fr:ont bumper of 
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the truck. (Tr. ·66) From there the Ford jammed along 
the full twenty-four fnot. length of the truck and t~hen 
moYed on up the highvvay and eame to rest on the east 
s·houlder in a. condition ·Of almost -complete demolition. 
(Tr. 67) Sa.muelHon 's testimony is that at the instant of 
collision his truck 'vas as far .over upon the righthand 
(west) shoulder of the highway as it could be safely 
driven .and that the Ford came into the west side where 
it had no lawful right to be. ('Tr. 66, 67) The tHstimony 
of .S.amuels·on in this respect is .confirmed by unimpeach-
able evidence of the marks left upon and near the high-
way. 
'!'he collision under discussion received extraordi-
nary attention from public officers whose duty it wa.s to 
investigate such occurrences and wh'o went upon the 
scene in their official ·Capacities for the purpose of care-
ful and impartial inspection. Within a. few minutes after 
the accident Len Huff and Ralph Chapple, tr,affic officers 
of Payson City, were at the scene making observations 
and discovering and noting marks upon the highway. ('Tr. 
288, 318) Within approximately an hour of the acci-
dent a deputy .sheriff .of Uta:h County and a member of 
the State Highway Patrol .arrived upon the scene and 
spent approximately one hour and a half i:n making min-. 
ute inspecti'ons and investigations of -conditions. (Tr. 
178, 213) Early on the morning followi·ng, the sheriff 
of Utah County and one of his deputies arrived upon the 
scene in .company with assistant county attorney, Dean 
Terry. ('Tr. 192, 333) ·These men were foll1owed shortly 
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by Ralph Smith, chief inspector for the Public Service 
Commission of Utah, and one of his assistants. (Tr. 283) 
All of the officers mentioned went to the scene of 
the accident in the line 'Of their duty and each was charged 
with the responsibility of making a careful inspection 
and observation for the purpose of determining, if pos-
sible, the cause of the collision. The testimony nf all 
investigator·s tells with full accord that the accident oc-
eurred on the west ·side of the highway where the truck 
had a lawful right to be and where the Ford had no 
right to be. 
B·efinre deseribing fue significant marks upon the 
highway .and adjacent earth, it seems well to briefly de-
seribe the highway itself. At the point of the accident 
the roadway was approximately level .and .for four hun-
dred feet south and several hundred feet north of the 
point of impact the road was .straight and ran in a di-
recti~on about north and south. There is a cement strip 
eighteen feet and two inches wide with a yellow line about 
three inches wide marking the middle of the strip. On 
either side of t:he ·cement there is .a gravel and sand 
shoulder about four. and one-half feet wide and approxi-
mately level with the cement strip for .a distance of four 
a·nd 'One-half feet on either. side and .sloping from the 
outer edge at a rate of about one .and one-half to one. 
The shoulders were firm and provided good support for 
traffic. On the east ·side :of the 'highway a level was ob-
tained at the time of ·construction by cutting away the 
hillside, while on the west side the same level was ac-
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complishe-d by means of filling. To the west of the high-
way the ·C-ountryside slopes to the west. and beyond the 
shoulder \Yas covered with soft s-oil. East of the high-
\Yay the countryside rises to the nearby hills. 
The truck involYed \Vas a GMC 1'937 model weighing 
about ten tons ''~th its load. Across the front of the 
truck \Vas a heavy steel bumper about eight inches wide 
and one-half inch thick. (Tr. 184) The front wheels were 
the customary ·single \vheels equipped with pneumatic 
tires. Behind the front wheels there were two sets of 
dual wheels on either side, the first set .of dual wheels 
being referred to .as the drivers and t~he rear set as the 
dollies. The "~heels on either side were so aligned that 
the dual wheels .on the rear straddled the line of the front 
wheels "\\7hen the truck was in forward motion. 
An examination of the truck following the accident 
sho\ved that the initial impact of the Ford upon the truck 
was up'on the extreme left .end of the bumper. The 
bumper was bent back and driven against the left front 
wheel, turning the wheel in and :driving it back against 
the frame. (Tr. 184)· From there the Ford moved on 
against the front left fender, forcing it back against the 
cab door. (Tr. 20) The Ford then .moved on against and 
under t'he left side of the body to the rear \vheels. Bamuel-
s-on eould feel first the front end and then the entire side 
of the truck lift from the highway as the F:ord erashed 
along and against the front corner anl left side ,of the 
truck. (Tr. 67) The ·collision destroyed the steering con-
trol of the truck and it turned to the right and left the 
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highway. It came to rest west of the highway in the 
soft s'oil .at an angle of about forty-five degrees to the 
highway, while t~he Ford, reduced to junk .as it wa·s, con-
tinued its course and traveled northward up the high-
w:ay unti1 it finally eame to rest on or ne,ar the shoulder 
on the east side. 
T'he marks on and near the cement highway leave it 
perfectly plain where t'he truck and Ford were with re-
lati,on to the ·Center ·of the highw.ay at the instant of im-
pact. At rest after the collision, the right rear wheels 
of the truck vvere the nearest part ·of the truck to the 
cement strip. The distance be'tween those wheels and 
the \vest edge of the cement was sixteen feet. (Tr. 196) 
Trhe truck, being twe·nty-four feet long, the front wheels 
were approximately forty feet west of the west edge of 
the cement. The left front wheel o.f the truck, having 
been cramped in and driven ha:ck by the collision, dug 
or ,gouged out a conspicuous groove or furrow in the west 
shoulder and int:o the soft earth beyond. The furrow re-
ferred to could be m:ost plainly traced from the left .front 
wheel back to the left rear whee1s, under those wheels 
and hack to and upon the shoulder. ( Tr. 185, 186) That 
furrow or depression, o.f course, ended at the west edge 
of the cement but exactly at the edge .of the cement where 
the depreS'sion ended there appeared upon the cement 
a most conspicuous rubber burn or tire mark extending 
in a ·curve northward up the west half of the .cement in a 
solid black line for eighteen feet and .six inches. Fol-
lowing the black rubber burn from the e.ast end of the 
furrow referred to onto the pavement it curved to the 
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north from a northeast ... south,vest direction to a direction 
almost north and south. That mark, moving into the 
pavement from the \Yest edge, never reached or erossed 
the center line of the highway, but continued its full 
length upon the west side. The north end of the burn 
was the nearest point in its entire length to the middle 
of the 'highway and that point wa,s five feet and eight 
inches west of the center uf the highway and only three 
feet six inche.s east ·Of the west edge of the cement. ('Tr. 
77' 80, 186, 187' 192, 198, 199, 2:30, 221, 222' 223 ' 250' '251' 
270,278,284,286,309,313,314,322,336, 337) 
That the rubber burn on the cement thus de-scribed 
wa.s made by the left front wheel of t1he truck was de-
monstrated beyond all reasonable dispute. Ordinarily 
one seeing a rubber tire burn on the pavement might he 
left to some speculation .as to what tire produced it. But 
that heavy black mark, five to seven inches in width, could 
be followed from its northern end on the west side of 
the highway southerly and we~sterly over to the west edge 
of the pavement where it continued, not as a. burn but 
as a deep gro:ove across the shoulder, down the slope of 
the .shoulder, across .sixteen feet of soft soil to the left 
rear wheels, under the rear wheels and approximately 
twenty-four feet further west to the cripp[ed left front 
wheel where it ended. 
Eight feet north of the north end of .the rubber mark 
which we have just des-cribed there began another rub-
ber burn which ran in a northerly direction and whic.h led 
unerringly to th·e tire on the left rear wheel of the Ford. 
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That mark bega.n at a point three fe~t six inches west of 
the ·Center of the highway and continued in solid form 
for about ten feet. From there on it was a broken line 
to the left rear of the Ford. (Tr. 78, 188, 189, 190, 199, 
200, 202, 228, 231, 234, 33-6, 337, 338) That mark or 
burn continued, as one followed it northward on the west 
side of the center line of the ~highway for a distance of 
approximately twenty-five feet CTr. 338) when it curved 
a.cros.s the -center line and ·crossed the east half of the 
cement to the Ford coupe. The total length of that series 
of rubber burns which led south and west from the Ford 
to .a point three .feet six inehes west of the -center line, 
was forty .... seven feet. In addition to the recurring rub-
ber burns which made up the mark just described there 
were, along with rubber burns, frequent .scratches in the 
pavement made by contact with metal parts of the F'ord · 
as it bounced along. ('Tr. 189) Als·o, there were smears 
of paint from time to time which were the ,s-ame color a.s 
t~he paint covering the Ford. (Tr. 210, 343) Just as the 
first tire mark de.s-crihed w.as inescapably made by the 
left front wheel of the truck, so w;as the second line of 
tire and paint marks made by the Ford. It is equally 
heyond any rea.sonable dispute that both marks began in 
about the middle of the we,st half of the p.ave1nent. While 
the north end ·of the tire burn made by the left front 
wheel of the truck was eight feet south of the south end 
of the burn made by the Ford, both burns began in the 
west half of the pavement and one is impelled to the con-
clusion that the two vehiciles came together on the west 
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half of the cement at a point at or near where one or the 
other of these marks c.ommenced. 
All of the .marks just des.cribed were observed on the 
evening of the accident and carefully noted by city traffic 
officer Huff of P'ayson ·City, by Dep.uty Sheriff Christen-
sen of Utah County, by State Highway Patrolman Allred 
and by the truck driver Samuelson and the witness Wie-
gand, an employee of the defendant. They were carefully 
noted and observed the fol~orwing morning and careful 
measurements were ma.de by Deputy Sheriff Christensen 
and Assistant County Attorney Terry aided by Sheriff 
Durnell. 
Furthermore, the mark made hy the left front wheel 
of the truck was observe-d and noted on the night .of the 
accident by Traffic Officer Chapple ·of Payson and on 
the following morning by Chief Inspector Smith of th·e 
Public Service Commission. 
In addition to the .marks left on the eement and 
other marks heretofore des-cribed there were some most 
significant marks along the west .shoulder of the high-
way. Along the shoulder immediateQy behind the truck 
most marks that might have been made there were 
trampled out by curious persons who gathered soon after 
the accident. ('Tr. 251, 253, 271) But beginning on the 
west shoulder a few feet north of the truck t;he tracks 
made by the righthand du·al wheels ·Of the truck could be 
plainly seen along the edge of the shoulder for a distanee 
of approximately fifty feet. This fact was noted and 
testified to without dispute by City Officers .c:happle and 
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Huff of Payson, State Patrolman .Al!lred, kssistant Coun-
ty Attorney Terry and by '8amuelsnn and Wiegand. (Tr. 
2'26, 227' 2.35, 272, 278, 78, 84, 303, 325, 329) 
Plaintiffs offered as witnesses certain persons who 
were very briefly at the scene and who were drawn t1here 
by -curiosity. None of the,m was there f.or the purpose 
of making any investigation .and none made any measure-
ments or any record of what he saw. None remained at 
the .scene longer than a few minutes. ~Some of them failed 
to see the marks noted and measured .by the investigating 
'officers but none denie·d that such marks were there. 
Some testified to the presence of other marks upon the 
highway but such marks could not possibly have 
been made hy eithe-r of the vehicles involved in the 
collision under reVIi-ew. It was contend·ed upon the 
trial that the position of the truck after the col-
lision justified the contention th~at certain marks 
testirfied tn by Lant, Winn and McMillan were 
made by the truck a:fter the impact and before it 
left the -cement strip. But no such inference .can be 
justified as it is in .conflict with und.isputed and controll-
ing physical facts. If the truck had been in the position 
that such an inference would require it would inevitably 
have extended entirely .across the highway with the front 
end at the west shoulder and t1he rear end on or over the 
east .shoulder. In such a situation the Ford would have 
been required to go 'to the extreme west side of the high-
way in order to .s~trike the front of the truck and it would 
have 'been utterly impossi'ble for it to rub along the side 
of the truck and continue no-rthward up the highway a 
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distance of more than forty-seven feet as it actually did. 
If the inference contended for by appellants were adopted 
then all the undisputed physical facts app.e.aring after the 
collision would need to be revised .and amended. In suc.h 
a case the Ford wo-uld have run flush into the ~side of 
the truck. It would either have stopped at that point or 
it would have gone under or over the truck. No one con-
tends that any such thing occurred. 
A despairing effort was made by appellants to ex-
tricate themselves ·by res·ort to expert testimony. An 
engineer was sworn and testified that he had been put 
into possession of a truck somewhat similar to the 'one 
here involved; that he had driven the truck down some 
highway-not the one here involved-and had been un-
able to guide it o-ff the highway at the angle at which ap-
pellants ~contend defendant's truck lefi the highway. Of 
course, he did not .select a highway to drive off where 
there was .a precipitous shoulder and he did not arrange 
to have a heavily laden Ford -collide .at high speed with 
his left front wheel as he began the turn. He frankly 
admitted upon eross exa.mination that experiments sue~h 
as he undertook are ·of no value unless all factors which 
might influence the result are dupli~cated. His closing 
answers upon cross examination are an admission that 
his experiment was of no value. ('Tr. 174) 
In view of the foregoing facts defendant requested 
the court for a directed verdict and it is submitted that 
such motion should have been granted. If it should have 
been gran1ed then, as we contend, none of the plaintiffs 
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was entitled to a verdict from the jury. The motion, hav-
ing been overruled, the case went to the jury upon in-
structions which fully and fairly presented plaintiffs' 
theory of the -case .and there is no error in the record of 
whi.ch the plaintiffs can fairly complain. 
ARJGUMEN'T UPON APPEL:LtANTS' 
.AJS.SIG N·MENT S 
Plaintiffs assign erro.r on the part of the trial court 
in four parti~culars. T!heir first assignment of error is 
that the court refused to give their requested instruction 
No. 4 in the langu,age requested. An examination of the 
entire charge to the jury will demonstrate that the jury 
were fully and fairly -charged upon the theory contained 
in plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 4. The instruc-
tion as requested reads as :follows : 
''You are instructed, members of the Jury, that 
the Defendant has alleged that Ramona Smith 
was guilty of CJontributory negligence. The 
·burd·en i·s ·on the Defendant to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Ramona 
S·mith was guil{ty of contributory negligence. 
·That is, negligence which directly contributed 
to her death. , In . this connection you are in-
structed that if the fact th1a t five pers.ons '\vere 
riding in t~he F:ord coupe at the tin1e of the 
collision did not directly ·cause or directly con-
tribute to the ·collision in which Ramona Smith 
was killed, then, and in that case, the mere 
fact that Ra~mona Smith was r·iding in a. F·ord 
·COUpe with four other ·persons would not de-
feat any right that Plaintiffs Jes·se ·Smith and 
Ella May 'Smith may have to recover.in this 
action.'' 
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Our contention \Y'as, and now is, that upon· all the 
facts the occupants of the Ford coupe were guil'ty of con-
tributory neglig'ence as a matter of law, but the court 
having rejected our contention in that matter fully 
charged the jury in ac.corda.nce with plaintiffs' theory. 
In plaintiffs' brief only a portion of the court's in-
struction No. 7 as given is set forth, but having in mind 
the language ·Of the request we have just quoted it be-
comes essential to refer to certain parts of the charges 
actually given. Tthe court '.s instruction No. 7, to whieh 
no exception was taken, reads as follows : 
''You are further .instru-cted that it is provided 
by the laws of the State of Utah, that it shall 
be unlawful for the driver -of any vehicle to 
drive the same when such vehicle is so loaded, 
or when there are in the front seat of such 
vehicle such number of persons, as to obstruct 
the view of the driver to the front or sides, 
or to interfere with the driver's control over 
the mechanism of the vehicle. It is further 
provided by law that it shall be unlawful f.or 
any passenger in any auto-mobile to ride in 
such position as to interfere with the driver's 
view ahead or to the ·sides, or to interfere 
with the driver's control.over the driving me-
·Chanism of the automobile. 
''And in this ·connection, you .are instructed that 
it is for the jury to find and determine from 
all the facts and circumstances shown to exist 
at . the time of the collision herein, "rhether· 
either of the occupants, to-wit: Paul L. Nel-
son or Ramona. Smith, was guilty of negli-
gence in beeoming a passenger in said Ford 
·Coupe along with ~he driver and ot'her oecu-
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pants therein, and whether ·Or not such negli-
gence contributed in any degree to the col-
lision and to the injuries suffered, as com-
plained of.'' 
Instruction No. 7 quoted above is ha'Sed upon 57-7-50 
R. S-. U. 19'33 which, like all similar statutes governing 
the operation of motor vehicles, is intended to prom.ote 
the .safety of the highways. The section became a part 
of the statute law of this state after the accident involved 
in Ba.lle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 Pac. (2d) 224, had 
taken plaee. 
From the foregoing the -court will observe that it was 
plainly left to the .jury to determine not only whether 
Paul Nelson or Ramona Smith was guilty of negligence 
in becoming a passenger in the Ford coupe, but also 
whether ·such negligence contributed in any degree to the 
collision and to the injuries suffered. In connection with 
this subject it is also important to observe the language 
of the court'.s instruCJti:on No. 9. 
''If you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that either the said PaulL. Nelson or Ran1ona 
ISmit~h, w~as killed by reason of. the negligence 
·of the defendant, as alleged in the Complaints 
herein, then, in order to defeat the plaintiffs' 
right of recovery on t~he ground of contribu-
tory negligence, the burden is on the defend-
ant to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the sraid PaulL. Nelson or the said 
Ramona Smith, was guilty of negligence that 
pro~mately contributed to his or to her own 
death. And if upon the issue of contributory 
negligence, the preponderance of the evidence 
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is in favor of the plaintiffs, in either case, or 
if it is equaHy ba1aneed, you should find such 
issue in f~avor of the plaintiff.'' 
It w·ill be ohserved that the jury was there instructed 
that if eith~r Ramona Smith or Paul Ne~son was killed 
as a re-sult o£ the negligence of the defendant recovery 
for such death or deaths could only he defeated if the 
jury further found, first, that they, or either of them, was 
guilty of negligence, and second, that such negligence 
proximately contributed to the injury and death. 
Again in the court's ins,truction No. 11 it is made 
clear that the jury eould not defeat recovery on the 
grounds of contributory negligence unless such negli-
gen1ce were found to be a proximate -cause of the injuries. 
In the court '.s instruction No. 20 proxima;te cause is 
clearly defined by the .court. It is well settled that if, 
upon the hearing, a party's theory is fully and fairly 
sent to the jury such a party cannot complain because 
the ·exact language prop-osed in .a request for instruction 
was not followed. The full import of plaintiffs' request 
was given in such a. way that the ju.ry could not have 
been misled. 
Grow v. U .. L. ct T. ·Co., 
37 Utah 41, 106 Pac. 514; 
Cromeenes v. San Pedro~ Los Angeles & 
Salt Lake Railroad Co., 37 Utah 475, 
109 Pac. 10; 
Credit Men v. Boyle Furniture, 
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Jensen v. D. & R. G. Railroad, 
(1'9'14) 44 Utah 100, 138 Pae. 1185; 
Barlow v. 8. L. & U. Ry, 
57 Utah 312, 194 Pac. 665. 
Plaintiffs se'cond assignment of error is based upon 
the eourt 's refusal to give plaintiffs' requested instruc-
tion No. 3 to the effect that P:aul Nelson and Ramona 
Smith were required to exercise only that degree of care 
and caution which persons of like age, capacity and ex-
perience must re-asonably be expected to naturally and 
ordinarily use in the same siltuation ·and under like cir-
·Cumstances.· In connection with this request it must be 
remembered that Paul Nelson was a grown young man 
twenty years of age and that for a num·ber of years he 
had 1been employed in different occupations and a.t the 
time ,of his dealth was engaged as a prosp·ector. H·e was 
a young man of ordinary intelligence and was looked to 
by the plaintiffs for contribution~ toward their mainten-
ance and support. 
Ramona Smith had become sixteen years of age in 
June preceding the· accident. She had completed part 
of a high school education and because of her mother's 
illness was discharging the duties of a grown woman 
a'bout the house. Both Paul Nels·on and Ramona Smith 
were of stature .and weight ·above the average for grown 
women and men. 
In neither case were plaintiffs entitled io the re-
quested instruction. While we are not unaware of gen-
eral holdings hy this co.urt that the ·care required of an 
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inf·ant is to- be graduated to his age, nevertheless, up·on 
the record here made ~here is no authority requiring the 
giving of the request involved in eit~her ca.se. 
It has been genera·lly recognized that children of 
tender years are so far undeveloped as to be relieved of 
the charge of· negligence; that during another period in 
their infancy thel"e is rebuttable presumption against 
their capacity to understand and avoid danger; and that 
in the later years of infancy there is rebuttable presump-
tion that they are chargeable with the san1e degree of 
care as are adults. Ordinarily a child under seven year.s 
of age is conclusively presumed not guilty of contributory 
negligence. Between the ages of seven and fourteen, 
in the absence of showing to the contrary, an infant is 
genera.Hy assumed not to have the sa.me consciousness 
of danger and the same judgment in avoiding it as an 
adult. Above the age of fourteen, in the absence of a 
showing to the contrary, an infant is generally charged 
with 1laving attained that development which imposes 
upon him the same d·egree of care as an adult. This rule 
is well .stated in J one's Commen!taries on Evidence, 
volume 1, section 99 (a), pages 477 et seq. 
,,, In cases of torts arising from negligence, too, 
the age and capacity of the infant charged 
,, ... ith the tortious negligence may become mat-
ters ·of importance. For while infants ar~e 
justly a.nswera'ble for torts springing from 
their negligence, when such negligence is 
shown, it is evident that, in determining t~he 
question "rhether or not there is negligence 
in the given case, either on the part of the de-
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fendant ·Or on that of the plaintiff, the age and 
capacity of the defendant may be important 
to consider. Conduct which would be con-
sidered negligent on the part of a person of 
full age might not be so ·00nsidered in the 
case of an infant of tender years and im-
mature judgm·ent. And, on the other hand, 
one dealing w~th a person of immature cap-
acity 1nay be reas-onably required to exercise 
grela.te~ eare and diligence 'than wou1 d ibe 
demanded of him where he has to do with 
persons of mature judgment .and of ordinary 
·capacity. That which will be negligenc-e on 
the part of one infant may be proper care on 
the part oof another, depending upon the age, 
discretion, intelligence, or experience, of the 
infant. A child of tender years has capacity 
to exercise only such care and self-restraint 
as belongs to childhood. Reasonable men are 
presumed to know this, and must govern 
them·selves ac:eordingly. ·The caution and care 
required ·Of others to\vard the infant are 
measured by the age, the maturity, the cap-
acity, and intelligence of .th·e child. So that, 
"rhi1e in civil actions the law does not fix any 
arbitrary age when an infant is deemed in-
capable of exercising judgment and discre-
tion, there are num·erous instances in "rhir h 
courts have conclusively presumed children 
of tender years incapable of contribu.tory neg-
ligence and have refused to submit the ques-
tion to the jury. The cases show that this 
presumption has been indulged in by t~he court 
respecting children varying in age fro1n one 
to seven years. A ·child, too young to exer-
eise any eare or discretion, is 'clearly as in-
capable of negligenc·e as it is of crime or sin, 
and is therefore not ans\verable to the doc-
trine of self-defens.e. 'There are ages so 
young (usually under s-even) that therP is a 
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conclusive presumption of la,v, and hence evi-
dence is no\t admissible to refute the presumu-
• L 
t1on ~ while there are other ages, usually S·even, 
after reaching "\Yhich it bec:ome.s a prima facie 
presumption only, and may then be rebutted 
by evidence of unusual natural capacity, 
physical condition, training, habits of. life, 
experience, surroundings, and the like. This 
prima facie presun1ption .continues in its favor 
till it reaches another age, usually fourteen, 
after which the presumption .changes, and thE-
burden is then on the infant to sh<>w want of 
capacity or understanding. The questio·n as 
to "\vhethe:r a child's .capac1ty is. such that it 
may be chargeable with contributory negli-
gence is a question of fact for the jury, unle.s~ 
so young .and immature as to require the eourt 
to judicially kno-vv that it could not contribute 
to ilts own injury or be responsible for it'S acts, 
·Or so old and rila ture that the court must kn<:rw· 
that, though an infant, yet it is responsible. 
Where the infant is under fourteen years of 
age, the burden rests upon the defendant -to 
re'but the legal presumption of incapability of 
contributory negligence. As to t1hose over 
fourteen years of age the prima facie cap-
ability of negligence atta-chHs. Each ease 
must d·ep·end upon the intelligence and cap-
acity of t~he child ·and the surTounding facts 
rather than upon any arbitrary rule. It can-
not be said on the ·one hand that a child just 
past seven years is sui juris so as to he 
~charged with negligence, nor, on the otheif 
!hand, that a child just under that age is \Yhol-
ly incapable of exercising care. It ha~s gen-
erally been held that, since there is no ex·act 
period fixed by the law ·at which there is no 
doubt as to whether the ·child is sui juris, the 
question of intelligence and ability to exer-
cise care is for the jury under proper in-
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structions from the court. But it has been 
held that, in the absence of proof to the con-
trary, a: child fourteen years of age is pre-
sumed to have sufficient cap:acity to be 
sensible of danger and to have the power to 
avoid it." 
The point raised by this dicussion ';vas directly 
passed upon in : 
Mamiove v. Lavelle, ('Texas) 235 S. W. 324~ 
Black v. Grossma;n, (Pa.) 142 Atl. 316~l~V~ 
• . ___· 11..~ Crouch v. Noland,(Ky.) 38 S. W. (2d) 471; ~-. 
! · ~~~I,; Heflin v. Eastern Railway Co.,~·~~~t. ~a~ a. -~ ~V.~~ _. (Texas) 159 S. W. 499; ~ "W.YI•: ~., .... 1 ~~~~K'RailroadCompanyv.Rodgers,35S.W.243; qJ~ 
i · ~Charlton v. 4~nd §treet Railroad, ~ .~ • 
~~ .J A ~ 11 ~ 80 N.Y. S. 1t4; • 4 ~-r;_. ~~~~ · McDonatd v. Metropolita;n Railrb(!:d Co.~~ ~~~·~-:;-&LA~ J!·,r s. ~577; J:t'1.',-' ~ r- < ~"" f~A.f)~ 
, ___ ... - .· . ·' Koehler v. J';ra:cu.s~ Spemalty Mfg. C ... ·o~.·-·,_  ·,_.~ ~-) ; ~nftl· . .42 N. Y. S. 182, ~~ . £! 
.. ~ _ !- ,..... ~ Htlltard v. Murdock, ~ _ · • 
~~~. (Texas) 20 S. W. (2d) 1070; ·"<' . ~¥ · 
If'" vJ" .,. -~ San Antonio Traction Co. v. Ku11tpf, ~­
(Texas) 99 S. W. 86·3. 
Inso£ar .as the N elso1i case is concerned the question 
has been definitely settled against appellants' contention. 
It will,be remembered that Paul Nelson was twenty years 
of age at the time of the collision. There was no showing 
upon the trial of any d·efi'ciency, either physical or mental, 
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connected ''"ith his developn1ent. N·ot only would the 
generalla '':- charge N-elson, in the absence of some proper 
showing, with the responsiibility ·Of an adult but this court 
has gone one step further ,and has held that one nineteen 
years .of a.ge is to be reg~arded .as an adult in d·etermining 
the presence or absence of contributory negligence. In 
Netvton v. Oregon Short Lilne, 43 Utah 219, 230; 134 P. 
567, this court dealt with a. collision betw·~en a train and 
a minor nineteen years and eleven months of age. Young 
Newton was killed ·O~ a street crossing and the question 
of his contributory negligence ca.me under review by this 
eourt. In speaking to the precise p·oint now presented 
this. court said : 
''In principle this cas-e is not distinguishable from 
the case .of Cro1neenes v. San Pedro, Los 
Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company, 37 
Utah 475, 109 Pac. 10, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 
307. The only essential difference between 
that case and the one at bar is th.at in that 
case the injured boy was ·only about twelve · 
years :old, and hence was clearly of immature 
age, while in this case the deceased must be 
treated as a young man (an adult), .and 
further that in the Crome-enes Case the trains 
were approaching •O·n the two tracks from op-
posite directions.'' 
Ramona Smith was ~sixteen and .a half years of age 
at the time of the fatal collision and, in the abs.ence of 
some .showing to the contrary, plaintiffs were not entitled 
to have her conduct measured by that ,of any subnormal 
pers-on. The general rule of law f.or which we ·Contend, 
that one the .age of Ramona S·mith is not entitled under 
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the circumstances in this case to he regarded as under 
any disability in the absence of :a showing to that effect, 
is clearly reflected in the announced public policy of the 
state in connection with the operation .of motor vehicles 
upon the highways. A woman sixteen years of .age and 
otherwise qualified is ·entitled to receive from the state 
a license to drive an automobile upon all :of the highways 
of the state. This .authorization must proceed upon the 
assumption that in the :absence ,of some demonstrated 
infirmity, not presumed to exist in persons sixteen years 
of age, such .a person is presumed to .possess that dis-
cretion and phy.sical eapacity consistent with the safe 
use of the highways. 
We do not ·eon tend that the statute, withholding 
licenses to drive fr.om persons under sixteen years of 
age and authorizing their issuance to persons sixteen 
years of age and over, undertakes to declare that all 
persons licensed to ·drive possess the same ·capacity, but 
it -certainly must be -construed as setting an age at and 
.above which the presumpti,on of adult r·esponsibility at-
taches. If either Paul Nelson or Ramona Smith had 
failed to attain the mental and pby,sical development 
normally attained at their respective ages the facts could 
easily have been presented by appellants and the burden 
was upon them to make the proof. In both cases the 
proof was exactly to the contrary. The picture the 
jury got was of a perfectly normal young man twenty 
years of age and a perfectly normal young "roman 
sixteen years of age. N·either was subnormal in any 
respect and upon the record the jury should not have 
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been instructed that it was at liberty to !apply to their 
conduct any standards applicable to subnormal persons. 
The cases cited by app·ellants in their brief do not 
hold against our ·contention in this respect. Appellants 
cite 
Balle v. Srnith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P. (2d) 224; 
1vlontague v. Salt Lake & Utah Ry., 
53 Utah 368, 17 4 P. 871; 
Kyne v~. Southern Pacific Co., 
41 Utah 368, 126 P. 311. 
We will discuss them in the order cited. 
The minor involved in Balle v. Smith was fourteen 
years of age and it is true that this court stated that the 
degree of care required of her was not the same as that 
required tOf an adult, but the question here presented was 
not before the ·Court as clearly appears from the opinion. 
It is stated in the opinion that: ''No reference is made 
in any .of the requested instructions to the plaintiff '·s 
.age and the degree of care required of :a. minor fourteen 
years of age. '' 
Fr,om the foregoing it would .appear that it was not 
necessary for a ·decision of the Balle ·case to rule upon 
the precise point here presented. Certainly it w.as not 
necessary for the court to rule upon the standard of 
care required, in the absence of :a. showing of some d.efi-
ciency, of a sixteen ~or twenty y.ear old per.son. In con-
nection with the :obiter dictum in Balle v. Smith may he 
observed that in Payne v. Utah-Idaho .Sugar. Company, 
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62 Utah 598, 607; 221 P. 56.8, this court in discussing 
whether plaintiff's injury was brought within the at-
tractive nuisance theory ~stated: ''It may indeed be 
seriously questioned whether ~a lad of plaintiff's age 
and mentality may avail himself of the doctrine here 
involved." Plaintiff in that ·Case was fourteen years 
and eight months 'o·ld and ·sought recovery from the 
sugar company on the ground that it maintained a 
nuisance attractive to- children. 
In the Montague case, supra, the young woman was 
seventeen years old at the time of trial-probably six-
teen at the time of the :accident-but in that ·Case there 
was no question before the court such as the one· pres-
ently under review. There was no question there and 
no holding with regard to instructions upon the degree 
of ·care required in any· given case of a sixteen year old 
minor. There the question was whether the trial court 
should have instructed the jury to find ·contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. This court sustained the 
trial ·Court in s·ending the case to the jury in view of 
''her age, her lack of experience, the duty imposed upon 
her by law, and all of the other facts and circumstances'' 
(Utah report, volume 52, page 371). Plainly in that 
case there must hav·e been a showing .of a ''lack of 
experience'' and other ''facts :and ·circumstances'' which, 
when viewed in connection with the plaintiff's youth, 
moved this ·Court to the conclusion that contributory 
negligence as a matter of law had not been established, 
and that is all the case decides. In this case there is no 
showing of lack of experience and no showing of any 
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facts and circumstances which might be considered 1n 
c-onnection with the youth of the pers,ons involved. 
Kyne v. 8. P. Co. involved a child ten years of age 
and we would readily !agree that in the absence of a 
clear showing of extraordinary development care re-
quired of her \Yas not the care which would be required 
of an .adult. 
By its decision in the Newton case this court has 
settled the rule against plaintiffs in the N·elson case and 
it is earnestly submitted that upon the facts of the par-
ticular case and the general law applicable thereto plain-
tiff~s in the Smith case "rere not entitled to the instruction 
requested. 
Our c.ontention in this respect is sustained by well 
considered cases from other jurisdictions. A distinction 
is recognized between a situation wherein a minor pass-
ively fails to sense ·danger ~and one wherein the minor 
actively creates. the dange'r himself. It has been held 
that a minor who participates in the overcrowding of an 
automobile is guilty of -contributory negligence as .a mat-
ter of law. 
In Mahoney v. City of Pittsburgh, 181 Atl. 590, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had for r·eview a -case 
in which eight persons crowded into a Ford coup·e, four 
in the front seat and four in the rumble. An accident 
resulted and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1n 
holding that the ·Crowding of the Ford contributed as 
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a matter of law to the injuries, made the following state-
ment: 
''It is common knowledge that the space on the 
front seat ·of such a car is .slightly more than 
three and less than four feet, and that about 
one-half :of it is designed to accommodate the 
driver and furnish him with sufficient room 
t.o manipulate the apparatus designed to con-
trol the course of the car. Leonard, one of 
the witness-es, who sat ·On the front seat, said 
he weighed 180 p·ounds and that one of the 
wome.n .sat on his knee with her back 
to the doo~r. Another woman sat be-
tween Leonard and the driver. A driver 
n1ust al\vays have his car under rea-
s-onable control, though the measure of 
that duty may vary with circumstances; 
what is reas-onable on a highway in the coun-
try may he unreasonable in built-up sections. 
(Lorah v. Rinehart, 243 Pa. 231, 89 A. 967; 
McGettigan v. Quaker City A. Co., 48 Pa. 
Super. 602); the driver is affected by pro ... 
visions of the Motor Vehicle ·Code providing 
rules for safe driving (Jamison v. Kamerer, 
313 Pa. 1, 169 A. 231; Farmer v. Nevin Bus 
Lines, 107 Pa. Super. 153, 163 A. 41; Steven-
son v. Sarfert, 310 Pa. 458, 165 A. 225; 
Hegarty v. Borger, 304 Pa. 221, 155 A. 484); 
by the condition of the highway (Mason v. 
C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 302 Pa. 472, 153 A. 
754) ; and by the .character of the load carried 
or the manner ,of loading (D.orris v. Bridg-
man & Co., 29·6 Pa. 198, 145 A. 827; Boyle 
v. Leech, 298 Pa. 188, 148 A. 70). In this case 
the crowding of the front s·eat would so im-
pede and restrict the driver's freedon1 of 
motion as to make it impossible for hin1 to 
act freely in such emergencies as must have 
been expected .and actually occurred. This 
c~o·wding not only deprived him of the room 
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required to manipulate the .steering wheel 
and control the course of the ear generally, 
but put him at serious disadvantage in oper-
ating the gearshift and the brake. This im-
pairment of the power of .control, considered 
\vith the condition of the street, the poor vis-
ibility, and the corresponding necessity for 
a high degree of care, make it evident that the 
driver's negligence was .a -contributing cause 
to the accident. 
''Plaintiff, though ·a g~est, assisted in bringing 
about the crowded condition of the car. He 
\Vas cognizant ,of the danger (he was an ex-
perienced driver) and was therefore likewise 
guilty of contributory negligence. Curry v. 
Riggles, 302 Pa. 156, 159, 153 A. 325, and 
cases here cited.'' 
To the same effect i!s Mcintyre v. Pope, 191 Atl. 607, 
wherein the Supreme Court ,nf Pennsylvania .again ruled 
that: 
"Where more than three adult persons sit in the 
the front ·seat of an automobile, thus over-
crowding it and restricting the driver's free-
dom of action to exercise necess!ary control 
in the event of emergencies, and injuries 
result, those overcrowding the front seat are 
guilty of contributory negligence a:s a matter 
of law." 
In the case just quoted from it is interesting to ob-
serve that the plaintiff was eighteen years of age and 
was not the driver of the Ford coupe but simply a 
passenger who contributed to the overcrowding. In 
that case plaintiff urged that she should have been re-
lieved of the charge of negligence because of her youth. 
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That contention was disposed of by the court In the 
following language: 
"It is conill1·on knowledge, based on everyday ex-
, Jr::- 1 ... ~J>erience, that the ~overcrowding of the driv-IM-~-~ Pr,.f~~r's seat interferes seriously with reasonable 
.,,... · ~ control ·of the car, especially in the event of :,...,~-~ · emergencies which are likely to present them-
~ .... , ,1~ selves; and, where an accident results from 
· t ~~-.-- ~. the manner in "\vhich the car is operated, the t/.J /" ~~,conclusion inevitably follows that in son1e 
1\ 1\;rw /; 1,., measure the in1pairrnent of his control 0on-
f V j J.: JJ ~·t. tributed to it .and was one of the efficient 
~':~·-, _ causes of the injuries resulting. The hamp-
~/· tJif,. f ~· ering of appellee's control co-existed and 
0 -, j .... ·Operated with his own recklessness in driv-
.. J... ~ ~ ing at an excessive :speed in causing the col-
~~ ... j lision, and cannot be viewed in any other 6.).t .. llAi • light than as a oontributing cause. 
"It is also argued that, under the circumstances, 
· ~.- ,.,_. considering appellee's age, knoWledge, and ex-
~ ,. ..-~ ~ perience, she could not have he en expected to 
: • '.-.t J.~g ... ··-· know of the hazard created by her presence 
, ~V""" in the driver's seat, and to charge her with 
i ~ ~· _iJ contributory negligence .she must have had 
Ab~ '. reason to realize the existence of the danger 
f ~~ •. · )t, Jj...... and failed to do that which an ordinarily 
~·r;:~J;j;) prudent person would do under the circu~-~ ·· . iN"i_ :=-~ ...J)l~stances. AppelLant was bound to exercrse 
~,.Mr.:.~ reasonable care under the circumstances. ~ .~ ·J·~ I:ack .of kno,vledge of the da~gerous condi-
"V"" t, \ l I.A." bon created by the overcrowdmg of the seat f'f t ·. ~ would not absolve her from meeting this 1. ~ 7 t-standard of care in spite of her status as a ~7 _ · guest. Under the facts here presented, she 
was one of the active participants in the 
B'" '.A i. _i.J, . hazard impairing appellee's control. This A" tY"' .,.., ~. •1 '!Uust be distinguished from a case where the 
''V , r'' f negligence attributed to the guest 0onsists of 1• sitting by and joining by acquiescence in the 
~. ~~'~ ~J\ ~ b~· 
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negligence of the driver \Yithout adequate 
protestation. There, realization ,of danger 
may be material. Appellant was 18 years of 
ag·e, had considerable knowledge of the oper-
ation of automobiles, and was able to esti-
mate the speed at which cars travel. Her 
opinion that the presence of four occupants 
in the front seat did not hamper the driver's 
ability to operate the car does not excuse her 
from measuring up to the required standard 
of reasonable care notwithstanding· her own 
personal he lief.'' 
A conclusion to the same effect as that reached by 
the Supreme C·ourt of Pennsylvania in the tw.o cases 
'Cited .above was rea~ched by the Supreme C·ourt of 
Louisiana in Lorance v. Smith, et al., 138 So. 871. There 
four persons including the driver occupied the single 
seat of a Ford coupe. One of the f.our was the fifteen 
year old plaintiff and in discussing her and her age 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that she had 
reached the age of discretion. Because the case parallels 
the one nnvv under review so closely we quote the.refrom 
the following: 
~!I 
J~ ~ ·~ 
Jt~. 
:4~ 
"That Alphonsine Lorance and Adelia Menant, ~,'~ :1 
the guests in this case, were guilty of in- ~ ~ 
~epetn1dentt ntehgligen?de wthichdcotntrtibhu~ed_ p~--ox- , . ~ Ima e y o ·e acci en an o eir InJury '[ ~ 
,and death i's manif.es tly clear. This is made ~:s~ 
·cle~r ?Y the testimony .. But aside from that, ~~ 
plaintiffs' own allegations show that they '~ -~ 
were guilty of contributory negligence. They ~ ~ 
allege that 'Walter .Smith was guilty of 5 ~· 
g!·Os·s negligenc~ in_inviting three persons ~s ~. ~ · 
his guests to ride In ~ F,o,rd runabou~ built ~~"'- ~ 
for two and in alloWirrg and consenting to 
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Clark Morgan's driving said car in its crowd-
ed condition .at .an excessive and. unlawful 
rate of speed of fifty or m.ore miles per hour, 
on a foggy night'; and • That said Ford car 
was bu.ilt for the accommodation of only 
two persons, whereas there were. four persons 
riding in said runabout, thereby making it 
imp·ossible, due to the crowded cond.ition of 
said ca.r, for OZark Morgan to operate said 
car with safety, particularly at an unlawful 
rate of speed on a foggy night.' 
"We heartily concur with plaintiff's couns-el, 
who drew the,se petitions, that it was negli-
gent for Walter Smith to invite and permit 
£our persons to ride in a ·small car built for 
the accommodation of only two, e-specially 
on a foggy night, and that it was negligent 
for Clark Morgan to atten1pt to driv.e it 
under such conditions, and also that its 
, ·crowded conditi,on made it impo8sible for him 
to operate it with safety on a foggy night. 
These all·egations need no proof to support 
them. It is ~self-evident that the crowding of 
four grown people int:o the seat of a small 
car built to accommodate only two deprives 
the driver of the free us·e of both hands and 
arms, without which he cannot operate it 
efficiently and with safety. 
''Now let us eonsider the case fro1n the stand-
point of these guests. They had both reached 
the age of discretion, one being fifteen years 
old and the other a. woman who had been 
twice married :and was the mother ·of a child 
:seven years old. They knew, .as well as did 
the young men, that the night was foggy, 
that the Ford runabout was built for the 
accommodation of only two, and that for 
four people to -crowd themselves into a seat 
built for two would make it impossible for 
the driver to operate the car with saf.ety. 
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They kne"~ this before they entered the ear 
to go to Covington, and they knew it before 
they got into the ear to go home. Yet they 
·consented to ride in the car under those con-
ditions; they \Yere two of the £our who crowd-
ed into the seat ; they themselves helped to 
ereate the condition which made it impossible 
for Clark Morgan to operate the car with 
safety, helped create the condition which 
brought about their injury. Now, if it wa'S 
negligence on the part of the young men to 
invite the women to ride under those .con-
ditions, were not the guests also negligent in 
accepting the invitation and riding under 
those· ·Conditions~ M.ost assuredly they 
were.'' 
The foregoing cases are uncommonly close upon 
the facts to- the cases now under review by this court. 
But the facts of our cases call even more emphatically 
for the application .of the rule announced by the Penn-
sylvania and Louisiana cases. Here there were five fully 
grown pers-ons in the Ford ·coupe and here there was a 
statute condemning .such overcrowding. Alsu, here the 
evidence is positive that the driver ,of the Ford lost 
and was unable to regain ·Control of the Ford under 
such circumstances that the explanation mu:st be found 
in the overloading of his .coupe. 
Appellants assign error in that the trial court re-
fused to strike defendant's memorandum of costs and 
:a,ssert that the cost bill was not ''filed" within time. 
The section .of the code which controls -the ma.tter of 
·s·erving and delivering of ·Cost bill is 104-44-14 R. S. U. 
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'~ ( Jt *:t 36 __ y ~ ~ ) 1933. The .pertinent part of that section reads as 
~ l follows: 




''The party in who,se favor judgment is rendered 
and who claims his ·costs must deliver to the 
clerk and ·serve .a -copy upon the adverse 
party within five day,s after the verdict***''. 
It will be observed that the eode uses the language 
''deliver to the clerk''. · This i1s a departure fr.om the 
language used in many other sections :of the code where 
it is p:r.ovided that· the documents· must he filed with 
the -clerk or filed in the office of th_e ·clerk. In this case 
respondent served a .copy of the -cost bill upon .appellants' ·fr:g ~ 
· -~ ·""'- counsel in S.alt Lake City where he maintained his 
· \ :office .on the fifth day after the verdict and on the s.ame 
·• .· day delivered the same to the -clerk by depositing it in 
. · · , · to the clerk of the eourt at his office in Provo, Utah. 
~ . 
· ~ That the delivery of the cost bill to the ·Clerk by 
:? ~depositing the same in the mail was a delivery within the 
1 ~ '::::\1 statut~ w:as held in the case of Glousc~ster Mutual Fisk-~ 
1'~ ing Insurance Co. v. Hall, 96 N. E. 679 (Mass.). ~ ~ 
";::-.... See also : . ~·. 
~ ,'i ... t ' 
~ ,. dt·~- ;. HackleY_ Union National B_ank V'. Far·mer,.l , 1 
.~\£i~ (M1ch.) 234 N. W.135, ~··. 
1 Kansas f!ity Life Ins. Co. v. White, ~~-1 ~~J 
(Ar1zona.) 2·64 P. 47 4; · ,l/_ -. 
U:nterharnscheidt v. Missouri State Life 
Ins. Co., (Iowa) 138 N. W. 459. 
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Appellants eo1nplain because the court awarded full 
costs against the plaintiffs Smith and also against the 
plaintiffs Nelson. Appellants misconceive the effect of 
assessing the full amount of costs against both plain-
tiffs. They assert that ·One-ha1lf of the costs should 
have been assessed against the plaintiffs in each case 
and eontend as if the ·court were awarding double wit-
ness fees and double mileage. There was no taxing of 
witne,ss fees or double mileage or double per diem. There 
was taxed ·only the costs taxable in a single action and 
they were taxed .against .all plaintiffs whose action made 
defense necessary. 
Hespondent does not assert the right to reooiVer 
double fees for its witnesses. It paid its witnesses .only 
one day for ·each day's attendance and similarly it paid 
other costs only once, but it is entitled to look to all or 
any of the plaintiffs f.or full reimbursement. It is 
P-ntitled to a joint and ~several judgment .against all 
plaintiffs ·f.or the full amount of its taxable costs and 
. when its judgment or costs has once been satisfied it 
c·annot, .of course, make any further recovery. It has 
been put to certain expenses in connection with the 
defense of the consolidated action. Either one of the 
eases tried by itself would have resulted in the same 
expens·es and one case, .as well as another, created the 
necessity in eonnection with the consolidated trial. Re-
spondent does not seek to recover more th.an the amount 
expPnded. It seeks only one recov.e,ry, but it may look 
to all plaintiffs, or any of them, for reimbursement and 
if 'one of the plaintiffs !shall hereafter pay more than 
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his share of the judgment for costs he may look to the 
other: parties for reimbursement to the extent that his 
payment has exceeded his proportionate share. Point 
may be given to the co-ntention by assuming a corollary 
situation. Assume that the driver of the Ford had 
survived and plaintiffs had sued both this respondent 
and the driver of the Ford and had recovered a verdict 
against both for damages and costs. The ·costs would 
not have been .app.ortioned to the two defendants but 
would have been taxed in full against both. In such 
case a payment by either defendant would have dis-
charged a judgment for costs . 
. Support for our contention upon this point is to be 
found in the following cases : 
Kerrick v. E des, 19 F. ( 2d) 693 ; 
Proprietors of Kennebeck Purchase v. 
Boulton, 4 Mass. 419; 
William Ii. Frank Brewing Co. v. Mayor 
of New York, 46 N.Y. S. 24; · 
Gray's Harbor Boom Co. v. McAmmant, 
et al., (Wash.) 58 P. 573; 
Lamotte v. Martin, (La.) 27 So. 291; 
Moore v. Woodson, ('Tex,as) 99 S. W. 116. 
SUMMARY. 
An examination of the entire record fails to dis-
close any ·evidence of sufficient substance .or probative 
value to give legal support to any finding of negligence 
on the part of defendant. Defendant's truck was on 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the extre1ne righthand side of the highway .at the ·time 
of the collision. The driver had moved over just a.s far 
as he could to clear the way for the onco:riring Ford. 
There was open to the Ford and free of ·obstruction :the 
entire · east shoulder-four and one-half feet wide-· , 
the entire east half of the cement strip;.-nine feet-, and 
about five feet of the west half of the cement. There 
. - ... 
was open hig·hway more t·h·an eighteen feet W!de over 
which .the Ford ~ould have traveled in perfect. safety. 
B.ut the Ford was out of control .and ·0ould not be: brought 
into that portion of the highway intended for ·~ts ~se. 
Inasmuch as the evidence compels the 0onclusion· that 
the truck was on the west side of the highway '~t t~~ 
tin1e of the collisi·on the defendant was guilty · of no 
negligence as a matter of' law. The collision resulted 
' '' ,f' ' 
either from the negligence of the driver of the Ford.alon·e 
or from his negligence combined with that of his nmri-
er.ous companions who so crowded him as to make con-
trol·of the Ford difficult or impossible. : . ... ·,,:. 
But even if it should appear to this court that 
there is some evidence of negligence on the part of th;e 
defendant in the record ~still appellants' case cannot be 
:rescued. It is plain that the .accident ·could ha.ve been 
and would have been avoided if Sheffield had regained 
control of the F·ord during the four hundred feet . b~.~ 
tween th~e curve and the point of impact. The ~~oiVe­
men'ts of the Ford after reaching the .eurve and t;urning-
north bespeak without ·c:ontradiction .and with great elo~ 
qnenec the fact that the driver was so crowded ~hat 
cont.rol of the driving mechanism was impossible .. · 
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It was to av,oid just such situations that the legis-
lature, following the accident reviewed by this court in 
Balle v. Smith, 'supra, enacted 57-7-50 R. S. U. 1933. 
If a tragedy is necessary to demonstrate the wisdom .of 
that enactment certainly thiis cas-e is demonstration 
enough. 
Upon the trial we ·Contended, .and we now m-ost earn-
estly urge upon the court, that eontributory negligence 
on the part of the occupants .of the Ford was shown as 
a 1ua tter of law. The trial court concluded differently 
and sent the matter to the juiry with instructions clearly 
leaving it to thHm to find (1) whether P·aul N.elson and 
Ramona Smith were guilty ·Of any negligence, and (2) 
if so, whether such negligence contributed in any degree 
to the collision. The charge fully .and fairly submitted 
plaintiffs' theory. 
Plaintiff.s cannot be heard to complain that their 
requested instruction No. 3 was not given. Paul Nelson 
ca.me clearly within the ruling of t·he Newton case and 
there was no showing justifying any such contention 
as to Ramona Smith. 
The assignments of error dealing with the cost bill 
would seem to be of less than ordinary significance. In 
view of the fact that this appeal is taken by all appellants 
in forma pauperis the ·error.s assigned should not be 
sustained. The cost bill was 'served upon appellants' 
counsel and delivered to the ·clerk within the time re-
quired by the statute and certainly plaintiffs were not 
entitled to have the costs .apportioned among themselves. 
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To have defended either case separately the defendant 
would haYe been required to produce exactly the srune 
witnesses and obligate itself for the :same mileag·e as it 
produced and £or which it was obligated in the consoli-
dated hearing·. Respondent is entitled to recover its 
taxable costs and if it ever 1nakes recovery from any 
defendant its claim will, of courg.e, be dis-charged. It 
does not seek and would not be permitted any recovery 
beyond that and it should be asked to accept nothing 
less. 
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiffs wer·e ac-
corded a fair hearing and that the verdict of the jury 
should not be disturbed. 
tTunn, RAY, QuiNNEY & NEBEKER, 
_A_ttorneys f:or Respo~ndent. 
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